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PROMOTING THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S CREATOR-
FAVORING PRESUMPTION: "WORKS MADE FOR
HIRE" UNDER AYlMEs v. BoNELLi & A vEC
SYS7EMS, INC. V. PEIZFER
PROFESSOR ALAN HYDE & CHRISTOPHER W. HAGER*
INTRODUCTION
In the abstract, it is virtually irrefutable that what one creates should
rightfully belong to the creator; however, this assumption rests on a deli-
cate foundation under U.S. copyright laws.' Of particular precariousness
is the relationship between a party funding such a creation and the creator
herself. Where a copyrightable work has been produced in an employ-
ment-type setting, the issue becomes difficult to resolve. Should the party
who financed the original work, or the individual who created it, be its
copyright owner?
Congress addressed this issue in § 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976
("1976 Act"), 2 in which it defined "works made for hire"3 in part as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment [hereinafter § 101 (1) ]; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work,
as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer ma-
terial for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be consid-
ered a work made for hire [hereinafter § 101 (2)].
4
Section 201 (b) of the 1976 Act gives substantive meaning to this defi-
nition by providing that:
* Professor Alan Hyde is a Sidney Reitman Scholar at Rutgers-Newark School of Law
and is a visiting professor at Yale Law School during the 1993-94 academic year. Professor
Hyde is supervising a series of studies on disputes between employers and employees over the
ownership of ideas. Mr. Christopher W. Hager is the Editor-in-Chief of Rutgers Computer &
Technology Law Journal at Rutgers-Newark School of Law and will be graduating from
Rutgers in the Spring of 1994. Mr. Hager is the primary author of the study comprising this
law review article.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Congress is constitutionally
empowered to promulgate intellectual property legislation under Article I of the Constitu-
tion, which provides that "Congress shall have the Power ... To Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2544 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Congress' enactment of the 1976 Act replaced
the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
3. For stylistic fluidity, a "work made for hire" will generally be referred to as simply a
"work for hire."
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other per-
son for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright. 5
What becomes apparent when reading these provisions is the control-
ling nature of § 101 over § 201(b). 6 Only where a work was created
"within the scope" of an employee's employment or was commissioned or
ordered as the subject of an express written instrument executed between
the parties involving one of the nine exclusive works listed in § 101(2)
7
can a § 201 (b) "work for hire" analysis ensue.
The modem "work for hire" doctrine's importance lies in its break
from copyright law's traditional presumption favoring the employer or
funding party over the actual creator for the purposes of assigning copy-
right ownership.8 Recent case law illustrates this departure. In two recent
federal court decisions involving authorship of computer programs, Aymes
v. Bonefi9 and Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer,10 program creators retained own-
ership of their personal "works"'1 notwithstanding the employment or
work for hire setting related to the programs' development.
12
This Article will present the facts of both cases and discuss the devel-
opment of the underlying legal principles. After discussing the historic
tension between copyright ownership of a work created by an individual
who is not clearly recognized as an "employee" I3 and the understandable
5. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
6. See Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d
323, 328 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that § 201 "makes the buyer" of a work its "author and initial
owner" only where the "work was made for hire"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); Mister B.
Textiles Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (observing, as a
preliminary matter, the controlling nature of § 101 in a work for hire examination). But see
Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding one of § 201 (b)'s
traits to be its vesting of initial copyright ownership in employers).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CAN. 5659, 5737 [hereinafter HoUSE REPoRT] (noting the "specific categories of
[§ 101 (2)] commissioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire' under certain
circumstances") (emphasis added). See also Robert A. Kreiss, Ten Theories for Hiring Parties Who
Want to Own Works Created or Invented by Independent Contractors, COMPUTER LAW., May, 1991, at
11 (outlining the "three requirements" involved in § 101 (2) "work for hire" examinations).
8. See I.T. Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress Really Intended, 35
J. COPp. Soc'v 210, 211-12 (1988) [hereinafter Hardy I]; see also infra notes 42-61 and accom-
panying text (discussing the evolution of the work for hire doctrine up until the 1976 Act).
9. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
10. 805 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd in partk vacated in part and remanded, Nos. 92-
2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1994).
11. Copyright law recognizes original creations fixed in a "tangible medium of expres-
sion" as "original works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added). Ac-
cordingly, usage of the terms "work" and "works" throughout this article refers to
copyrightable original creations. In a similar fashion, the word "creator" will be used genei-
cally to indicate a person who produces a work of authorship utilizing his or her individual
thoughts and creativity. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
a copyright "[a]uthor" is simply a work's "originator").
12. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992); Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F.
Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992).
13. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Nowhere within the cur-
rent copyright statute is the term "employee" defined. It has been contended, however, "that
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proprietary interests of a party funding the work's creation, this Article
contends that the recent decisions reflect a trend creating a presumption
in favor of an individual creator's artistic interests.1 4 Simply stated, judicial
adherence to this congressional objective will promote the predictable
evolution of a modem copyright "work for hire" doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Creative Process of Writing a Computer Program
Copyright laws only protect original expression. 15 Due to the way
computer programs are written, Congress has chosen to protect them
under copyright law as "literary works." 16 A computer program 17 is "a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result."1 8 Put simply, a program is
the part of a computer that "makes [it] go, what brings it to life, [and] what
turns it from a heap of fancy parts into a powerful working tool."19 Similar
an 'employee' for copyright purposes is one who is a formal, salaried" member of an em-
ployer's work force, Hardy I, supra note 8, at 212, or an individual "who receives employment
benefits required by law and whose employer withholds taxes from salary." Marci A. Hamil-
ton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made For Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misin-
terpretation and Injustice 135 U. PA. L. RE'. 1281, 1313 (1987). But see I MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B] [1], at 5-25 n.80 (1993) (asserting that
whatever the formal, salaried employee standard gains in predictability is lost because of
"rigidity and unfairness" when used in close cases).
14. Related to this proposition, but beyond the more narrow scope of this article, is the
efficacy of valid contractual arrangements between creating parties. For a current discussion
of this topic, see Mary M. Luria & Laura Butzel, Legal Rules Still Hazy on "Workfor Hire," NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at S21, 22-24.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
16. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 16 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU]. "Literary works" are defined under copyright law
as: "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books,
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embod-
ied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
17. It is helpful to segregate a "computer," which comprises hardware such as the cen-
tral processing unit [CPU] and some memory, from its activating software, which entails the
written statements and instructions upon which the hardware acts. See Randall Davis, The
Nature of Software and Its Consequences for Establishing and Evaluating Similarity, 5 Sovw A LJ.
299, 302-03 (1992) (analyzing "hardware" and "software" separately).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Two general types of computer programs are available:
Operating system programs, such as DOS... and OS/2 ... control the basic functions
of the computer hardware, such as the efficient utilization of memory and the start-
ing and stopping of application programs. Application programs [such as Wordperfect
6.0 or Lotus 1-2-3] permit a user to perform some particular task such as word
processing .... or spreadsheet calculations ....
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Mass. 1990) (emphasis
added). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (3d
Cir. 1983) (holding operating system programs to be copyrightable), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (recog-
nizing that application program was copyrightable); PETER NORTON, INSIDE THE IBM PC 19
(1986) (stating that operating systems programs aid in the computer's function while appli-
cations programs help to get the user's work done).
19. NORTON, supra note 18, at 16-17. See Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary
Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1493, 1512-13 (1987) (stressing the distinction between a functional computer and the writ-
ten program that enables the computer to perform different functions).
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to "more time-honored literary works" such as novels, the process of writ-
ing a computer program illustrates originality and imagination.
2 0
The first step in developing a program requires the programmer to
ascertain the program's "ultimate function or purpose."21 For example, a
programmer might be asked to write a program that will calculate figures
associated with the fiscal revenues of a business. The written program pro-
vides the means by which the programmer instructs a computer to per-
form this function. Once a programmer begins designing and writing the
program, she embarks upon a process that involves making numerous cre-
ative decisions. These decisions can be divided into two categories or
stages.
First, the programmer must design the program's internal structure
or "logic."22 She will begin this stage by dissecting the program's overall
idea into the more integral "problems or 'subtasks'" associated with
achieving its primary purpose.2 3 Typically, the programmer creates a flow
chart2 4 mapping out in human-readable form the various modules or sub-
routines that will respond to particular assigned electronic tasks.2 5 The
interaction between a program's modules or subroutines, which may be
further branched into submodules or sub-subroutines, constitutes the pro-
gram's structure.
26
As the program's structure develops, the programmer is confronted
by decisions on what data are needed and where the data fit into the pro-
gram's overall operations.2 7 In theory, no programmer is limited by either
the number of ways she can solve data organization problems 28 or the
names she chooses to identify the elements in her program.
2 9
20. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU, 106 Hav. L. REv. 977, 983 (1993).
21. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1229 (3d Cir. 1986) (initial
step in program design is identification of "the problem that the computer programmer is
trying to solve"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
22. See Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1531 (noting that a program's logic is a "principal
characteristic").
23. Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expresion?: Determining the Scope of
Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MicH. L. REv. 866, 870 (1990).
24. A "flow chart" has been characterized as "a graphic representation for the definition,
analysis, or solution of a problem in which symbols are used to represent operations, data
flow, or equipment." CONTU, supra note 16, at 21 n.109. It has been observed that flow
charts of "sufficient intellectual labor" or originality are copyrightable works of authorship.
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 45 (D. Mass. 1990) (quoting
CONTU, supra note 16, at 21).
25. "Modules" are sections of programs "devoted to one of the major capabilities of the
program" [Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1524], while "subroutines" are sets of instructions
used together to achieve a particular result. Davis, supra note 17, at 304. See Autoskill Inc. v.
National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1491 n.18 (10th Cir. 1993) (defining mod-
ules and subroutines), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
26. Englund, supra note 23, at 871.
27. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1230 (3d Cir. 1986).
28. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230. As a practical matter, efficiency concerns may be the only
limit on the ways a programmer might solve data organization problems. See id. (noting that
the efficiency of a program can be improved through "different internal arrangements of
modules and subroutines").
29. Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1534.
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Once the program's internal logic has been determined, its structure
is written into a language that the computer can understand.3 0 This is the
second stage of program writing, and it is called coding.
3 1
The first step of coding requires the programmer to write the pro-
gram's structure into a "source code" language, which can be one of sev-
eral high-level language styles such as FORTRAN (FORnula TRA.Mlation)
or COBOL (COmmon Business Oriented Language).3 2 These higher-level
statements represent the programmer's human-readable version of the
program, written in easy-to-understand English often accompanied by
common Arabic numerals.3 3 One court has analogized writing the source
code to" 'the novelist fleshing out the broad outline of his plot by crafting
from words and sentences the paragraphs that convey' the ideas."
3 4
Upon finishing the source code version of the program, the program-
mer translates the source code into a binary language consisting of
machine-readable sequences of Os and is.3 5 Although programmers'origi-
nally wrote object codes, "interpreter" and "compiler" programs now
translate a programmer's source code into the necessary object code.
3 6
Following the coding process, the programmer will run the software on a
computer to "debug"3 7 it and "correct any logical and syntactical errors" it
may contain.3 8 Once this process is completed, so is the program.
39
Based upon the above discussion, it becomes clear "that the detailed




30. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992).
31. Id.
32. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp.
37, 44 (D. Mass. 1990).
33. See Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1522-23.
34. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 698 (quoting Marc T. Kretschmer, Note, Copyright Protec-
tion for Software Architecture: Just Say No!, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. Rav. 823, 826).
35. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 698.; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740
F. Supp. 37, 44 (D. Mass. 1990); see Clapes et al., supra note 18, at 1520-21. The object code
is written in bits, or B/nary digiTS, each of which represents a single binary decision "such as
an 'on' - 'off' or 'yes' - 'no' choice." Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 43. Eight bits constitutes a "byte"
and 1024 bytes comprise a "kilobyte." Id.
36. Interpreter and compiler programs achieve their ends by slightly different means.
An "interpreter" program is a simultaneous translator that works in conjunction
with the application program every time the application program is run, carrying
out the instructions of the program one step at a time. In contrast, a "compiler"
program translates the program once and for all into machine language, after
which the translated program can be executed directly by the CPU without the
need for any further resort to the compiler. A distinctive "interpreter" or "com-
piler" program is available for each type of source code programming language and
each type of CPU.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 44; see also HARRY KAxr.4, JR., OPERATING SSTIMs: A PRAGMATIC Ap-
PROACH 23-24 (1986) (discussing compiler and interpreter programs).
37. "Debugging" is simply the removal of errors in the program, but it is far from simple
when done for a large, complex program. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1231 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
38. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992).
39. Id.
40. Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1544.
41. See generally KAxAN, supra note 36, at 12-36 (explaining the structure and technology
of computer programs).
1994]
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B. "Works for Hire" Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909
Early common law cases dealing with works allegedly created "for
hire" involved disputes over the ownership of copyrightable subject matter
generated in a traditional employment setting.42 These early opinions
fashioned a presumption resting copyright ownership in employers for any
works prepared by one of their employees. 43 Justice Holmes's opinion in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.44 was representative of this early
common law presumption. Bleistein focused on the alleged copyright in-
fringement of chromolithograph circus advertisements prepared by the
plaintiffs' employees.
45
Justice Holmes asserted that the plaintiff-employers owned the origi-
nal designs, because they were "produced by persons employed and paid
by the plaintiffs in their establishment to make those very things."4 6 The
employers in Bleistein employed the artists for the express purpose of creat-
ing the advertisements. Bleistein therefore dealt with works unmistakably
created "for hire." Works created by an individual commissioned or spe-
cially ordered by a hiring party, however, involve a completely different set
of issues.
C. The Copyright Act of 1909 and "Work for Hire"
The Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act) § 26 provided merely that "the
word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for
hire."47 Nothing more illuminating was contained in the entire 1909 Act.
This phrase was interpreted to be simply a codification of the common law
presumption favoring employers. 48 A study by Borge Varmer, supported
by the 1958 U.S. Copyright Office, that analyzed the "statutory concept of
works made for hire"49 heavily influenced this interpretation. After re-
viewing the case law, Mr. Varmer concluded that because the decisions
"involved salaried employees who received either a fixed salary or a mini-
42. See, e.g., Colliery Eng'r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch. Co., 94 F. 152
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
43. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1283; see Colliery, 94 F. at 153. In Co/!iety, the Circuit
Court for the Southern District of New York held that an individual's compiling, preparing
and revising of "instruction and question papers" while a salaried employee became the liter-
ary property of his employer. Id. One commentator has noted that this common law pre-
sumption was simply an extension of the master-servant doctrine. Michael C. Smith, Work For
Hire: Revision on the Horion, 30 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 21, 26 (1989).
44. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
45. Id. at 248.
46. Id.
47. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1087. This section was originally codi-
fied as § 62 and then subsequently renumerated in 1947 as § 26. See Act ofJuly, 30 1947, ch.
391, § 1, 61 Stat. 652 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976)). In 1976, Title 17 was
revised in its entirety by the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
48. See infta notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
49. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PArr.is, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY 13, at 128
(Comm. Print 1960) (by Borge Varmer), reprnted in I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 717, 720 (Copy-
right Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed., 1963).
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mum salary plus commission,"5 0 § 26 implicitly considered as made "for
hire" only those works created "by salaried employees in the regular
course of their employment."51 Although embodying the employer-favor-
ing presumption, § 26 offered no guidance for defining the terms "em-
ployer" or "employee."5 2 This task was left to the courts.
53
The 1909 Act also failed to address the important issue of how to treat
works created by independent contractors. Although Congress recog-
nized the practical significance of this issue during legislative hearings on
the 1909 Act,54 the final enactment failed to resolve this issue.55 Absent
any legislative direction, courts applying the 1909 Act also failed to differ-
entiate a full-time, salaried employee from an independent contractor,
"generally presum[ing] that the commissioned party had impliedly agreed
to convey the copyright, along with the work itself, to the hiring party."
5 6
During the 1909 Act's waning years, courts crafted principles granting
copyright ownership to an employer who "possessed the right to direct
and to supervise the manner in which the work was being performed"5 7 or
where the "employee's work [was] produced at the instance and expense of
his employer."58 In particular, the Second Circuit held a commissioned
party to the same standards as that of an ordinary employee where a work
was created "at the instance and expense" of a funding party.59 This stan-
50. Id. at 722. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
51. 1 STuDIES ON COPYIGHT, supra note 49, at 722. See Hardy I, supra note 8, at 223;
Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1284 & n.16 (citing various authorities supporting the belief that
the 1909 Act bestowed upon an employer ownership in the works created by a full-time sala-
ied employee during the regular course of business).
52. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 744 (1989).
53. Id. Although interpreting the 1976 Act, which also did not define the crucial terms
"employer" or "employee," the Fifth Circuit reacted to the difficulty inherent in this task in
bemoaning that "[t] he more we examine the statute and cases interpreting it, the more puz-
zled we become." Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters.,
815 F.2d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
54. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1284-85.
55. Id. at 1284.
56. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1285 (noting that judicial
standards created under the 1909 Act for determining whether an employment relationship
existed had been carelessly incorporated into commissioned works examinations).
57. Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 936 (1970). See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-12 to 5-13.
58. Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir.
1966). This case was viewed as upending any potential balance between independent con-
tractor-hiring party ownership interests because the existing presumption, which granted
copyright ownership to an employer, rested on the belief that a traditional employee implic-
itly agreed to transfer his or her copyright to said hiring party. Brattleboro's application of this
same standard to a commissioned party pushed the "work for hire" analysis too far. See Hardy
I, supra note 8, at 242. Courts following Brattleboro treated cases involving a commission rela-
tionship in a manner comparable to the way employment disputes were previously resolved.
See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusing to frus-
trate the work for hire statute's "purpose" with "conceptualistic formulations of the employ-
ment relationship"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
59. Brattleboro Publishing, 369 F.2d at 567-68 (finding the work for hire principles that
apply to an employee's work "produced at the instance and expense of his employer" also
applicable "when the parties bear the relationship of employer and independent
contractor").
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dard would not carry into the next generation of "work for hire" analysis,
but the "right to control or supervise"6° standard would.
6 1
D. The 1976 Act: Distinguishing An Employee From a Commissioned Paty
A revision of U.S. copyright laws began in 1955.62 With this revision,
Congress and the Copyright Office intended, among other things, a total
revision of copyright law's view on the employment relationship. 63
After sponsoring a number of studies on copyright's evolution, the
Copyright Office issued an initial legislative proposal in 1961 that distin-
guished traditional employees from independent contractors. 64 The 1909
Act's employer-favoring presumption for commissioned works made Con-
gress' treatment of these works a major issue in how "work for hire" would
be defined under the new copyright laws.65 The Copyright Office's recog-
nition of the importance of creators' proprietary interests played a signifi-
cant role in Congress' treatment of this issue.66
In 1963, the Copyright Office proposed a "Preliminary Draft" for a
copyright act67 that provided for a segregation of commissioned works
from those created "for hire."68 This proposition met with strong resist-
60. 1 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-13. One commentator has in-
sightfully noted that the "control" element will always be part of the work for hire analysis
because it is inherent to the notion of an employment relationship. See Robert A. Kreiss,
Scope of Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-Made-For-Hire 1rviso of the Copyright
Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests, 40 KAN. L. Ray. 119, 127 (1991).
61. See, e.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 21 U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) 1716, 1717 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (con-
cluding that although "Aymes may not have been an employee in the classic sense," he per-
formed the programming work "under the direction and supervision" of Bonelli), rev'd and
remanded, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
62. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989); see also
Hardy I, supra note 5, at 221-22; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1290. See generally Jessica D.
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Leg*slative Histoiy, 72 CORNELL L. REa. 857, 870-79 (1987)
(discussing in detail the activities behind the 1909 Act revision process).
63. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1290-91. A comprehensive examination of what lead
up to enactment of the 1976 Act's "work for hire" provisions has been meticulously covered
in Professor I.T. Hardy's 1988 article, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress
Really Intended, 35J. CoPR. Soc'v 210 (1988).
64. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744; see Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1291.
65. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5737.
66. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1290-91, where a Register of Copyrights report is
quoted as saying that:
[w]hile some limitations and conditions on copyright are essential in the public in-
terest, they should not be so burdensome and strict as to deprive authors of their
just reward.... [The creator's] rights should be broad enough to give them a fair
share of the revenue to be derived from the market for their works.
Id. (quoting REGISTER OF CoYmiGHTs, 87TH CONG., 1ST Sass., CoPYRGHT LAw RmvisIoN 6
(Comm. Print 1961)). See also Hardy I, supra note 8, at 224 (pointing to the separation of
commissioned works from those characterized as being "for hire" in the 1961 Register's Re-
port). For an interesting natural law approach to creator's rights, see Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in SelfE"rssion: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (discussing under Lockean theory the intellectual property
interests of creators).
67. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744-45 (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARv, 88TH
CONG., 2D SEss., COPYRIGHT LAw REVIsION, PART 3: PREusINARY DRAr FOR REVIsED U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAw AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON -hE DATrr 15 n.l1 (Comm. Print 1964)).
68. Hardy I, supra note 8, at 228; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1291.
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ance from associations whose members relied on copyright protection.
These groups disliked this classification because it enabled a commis-
sioned creator to reclaim an assigned work69 through reversion. 70 In def-
erence to industry concerns, a revised bill proposed in 1964 maintained
the employee "for hire" proviso, but included new language that would
make "for hire" a commissioned work or one prepared "on special order"
if the parties agreed in an express writing that it would be considered as
such. Understandably, objections remained on both sides of the reversion
issue. Creators argued that this new condition would enable parties with
superior bargaining power, generally employers, to pressure those with-
out, generally creators, into signing a writing, 7 1 while industry representa-
tives continued their opposition to any reversionary rights in creators.
72
These polar stances led to a "historic compromise" in 1965.
7 3
In an attempt to meet the conflicting positions of industry and cre-
ators, a bill was proposed in 1965 denoting four particular works created
by either special order or commission that could be considered made "for
hire."74 After the publishing industry expressed displeasure over the four
works' exclusivity, a further compromise increased the number of commis-
sioned or specially ordered works that could be "for hire."75 In exchange,
69. Ownership of a copyright can be transferred under 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1988),
which provides in part that "[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law."
70. The significance of this industry concern, voiced by groups including the Authors
League of America, MGM and American Textbook Publishers Institute, was that as commis-
sioned works under the Preliminary Draft were not "works for hire," they would not be ex-
cepted from the reversion provisions in the same manner as "works for hire." Hardy I, supra
note 8, at 233-37. This meant that the creator of an assigned copyright would be able to
recover ownership after a period of years expired through the property right of reversion,
which would arguably force employers to hire on as full time employees creators whom they
would otherwise treat as independent contractors. Id. The revision bill that would issue in
1964 removed "reversion" language in favor of "termination of transfer" language, which
would be the expression ultimately adopted in the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
71. See Hardy I, supra note 8, at 237; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1292. See generally
Copyright Law Revision, Part I: Hearings on H.R. 4347, Hi?. 5680, H.R 6831, H.R. 6835 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966) (statement of Leo-
nard Zissu, Composers & Lyricists Guild of America).
72. See Smith, supra note 43, at 28 (indicating industry's position that authors were not
at a bargaining disadvantage due to their affiliations with guilds and various professional
groups); Hardy I, supra note 8, at 237 (noting industry resistance to any right of reversion in
creators).
73. Reid, 490 U.S. at 746.
74. The 1965 bill provided that specially ordered or commissioned works that contrib-
ute to a collective work, are part of a motion picture, are translations, or are supplementary
works could be "for hire" if accompanied by an express written agreement between the par-
ties. Hardy I, supra note 8, at 238 (quoting STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., IsT SEss., COPIRGHT LAw REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REG-
ISTER OF COPVRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPvRIGHT LAw: 1965 REVISION
BILL 66 (Comm. Print 1965)).
75. The added works were those prepared as a compilation, text or test material, an
atlas, and a "history or statement of activities of a private business or organization." Hardy I,
supra note 8, at 240 (quoting Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R.
6831, H.)R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 134
(1965) (Memorandum of American Book Publishers Council, Inc., American Guild of Au-
thors & Composers, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, American
Textbook Publishers Institute, The Authors League of America, Inc., Composers & Lyricists
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the publishing industry withdrew its objections to the termination of trans-
fer provisions. 76 Save one deletion, this final compromise embodied the
language adopted and codified in § 101 of the 1976 Act.7 7 Implicit in this
last compromise was the creators' interest in individually crafted works not
being subject to any premature termination rights in others.78 Hence, the
1976 Act effectively removed the ownership presumption previously en-
joyed by funding parties with its limitation of § 101 (2) to nine exclusive
works supported by an express written agreement between both parties
stating that such work was to be "for hire."79 A construction of the mean-
ing of § 101(1)'s "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment" remained for the courts.80
E. "Works For Hire" Under the 1976 Act: Four Interpretations of § 101(1)
Culminating in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 81
1. Retention or Actual Wielding of the Right to Control
Although Congress expended significant effort to ameliorate the diffi-
culties resulting from the varied § 26 judicial interpretations under the
1909 Act, the 1976 Act perpetuated this interpretive problem by failing to
define "employer" or "employee."8 2 In Reid, the Supreme Court discussed
four different interpretations of what § 101 (1)'s "employee" and "scope of
employment" could mean. The first two virtually indistinguishable inter-
pretations explained that an "employee" created a work if the hiring
party8 3 retained the right8 4 or actually wielded the right8 5 to control the
Guild of America, Inc., Music Publishers' Protective Association, Inc., Music Publishers Asso-
ciation of the United States, Re H.R. 4347)).
76. Reid, 490 U.S. at 746; see also Hardy I, supra note 8, at 240.
77. The proposed work for "a history or statement of activities of a private business or
organization" was not part of the final "made for hire" enactment. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992).
78. See Smith, supra note 43, at 28 (contending that the independent contractors "won"
this aspect of the legislative battle over which works could be "for hire"); Litman, supra note
62, at 893 (noting that authors' and composers' creative rights could not be alienated in
advance).
79. See I NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-36 to 5-40 (contending that the
1976 Act's position on commissioned works leans more toward independent contractors than
commissioning parties).
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (no effort to expound on the meaning of
scope of employment").
81. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The Supreme Court noted that in the absence of [statutory]
guidance, four interpretations have emerged. Id. at 738; see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-13 to 5-18 (discussing all four interpretations).
82. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 739.
83. Professor Nimmer noted that the Supreme Court's choice of a "hiring party" charac-
terization of what would otherwise be considered an "employer" was because "the inquiry at
this stage [of Reid's rationale was] to determine whether the putative 'employer' may rightly
claim that status." I NIMMER & NrmmER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-13 n.27.
84. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39 (citing Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.
Colo. 1985) and Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
85. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739 (citing Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing
Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987), Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986) and Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984)).
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creation of a work. The Second Circuit's decision in Aldon Accessories Ltd.
v. Spiege4 Inc.8 6 explored these two interpretations.
Aldon involved a dispute over the copyright ownership of statuettes
created by a Japanese firm under the alleged auspices of Aldon Accesso-
ies. Aldon claimed that Spiegel's similar statuettes infringed its copy-
right.8 7 The Second Circuit agreed with Spiegel and held that these works
did not fall within § 101(2)'s listed scope.8 8 Spiegel contended further,
however, that as the statuettes were not within § 101 (2) and not created in
an employer-employee relationship as envisioned by § 101 (1), they did not
qualify as "works for hire."89
First, the court found Spiegel's interpretation of § 101(1) to be
"overly restrictive."90 Then the court stated that Congress did not intend
to dispense with the "work for hire" principles articulated in 1909 Act
cases and, as a result, both § 101 (1) and (2) applied to independent con-
tractors. 9 1 The court held that § 101(2) was relevant only in those cases
where the commissioned party did most of the work.92 Where an em-
ployer sufficiently supervised and directed a creator's work then an em-
ployer-employee relationship could be found even if the employee was
neither formal nor regular.93 By supporting the trial court's finding that
the statuettes created under Aldon's guidelines were made "for hire,"
9 4
the Second Circuit enunciated an "actual control" standard that other cir-
cuits then adopted.95 But this standard also received criticism for its disre-
gard of the congressional intent underlying § 101.
9 6
86. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
87. Id. at 549-50.
88. Id. at 551.
89. See id. at 551-52.
90. Id. at 551.
91. Id. at 552.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 553.
95. See, e.g., Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). But see Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas
Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1987) (showing a reluctance to follow Akdon by
distinguishing it factually).
96. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-15 to 5-16 (observing that
Aldon "carried forward standards from the 1909 Act" in determining what an "employee"
could be under the 1976 Act); Hardy I, supra note 8, at 241 (asserting that Aldon was "flatly in
conflict" with Congress' § 101 intent); Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1313 (proposing work for
hire amendment language which would overrule Aldon and its progeny). The court's surpris-
ing inattention to express congressional intent was most patently evidenced when it stated
that:
[n]othing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicates the Congress intended to
dispense with this prior law .... [If] Congress intended... to narrow the type of
employment relationships within the work for hire doctrine to include only "regu-
lar" employees, it is unlikely that there would have been no discussion of this
change in the legislative history.
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denie4 469 U.S.
982 (1984).
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2. "Agency" Guiding § 101 Employee Determinations
A third interpretation cited by the Reid Court was that § 101(1) "em-
ployees" followed the common law's agency rules,97 an approach that de-
veloped quickly after Aldon's sweeping decision.98 The Fifth Circuit's
decision in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises- espoused this "agency" approach.10°
The Easter Seal Society ("Easter Seal") sued Playboy Enterprises and a
New Orleans public television station for Playboy's use of film excerpts
originally shot by the T.V. station for Easter Seal's use.' 0 ' Although no
discussion of copyright had occurred between Easter Seal and the televi-
sion station prior to the first videotaping, Easter Seal argued that it ac-
quired copyright ownership of the film because it was shot "for hire."'
0 2
Affirming the defendant's partial summary judgment, the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected Easter Seal's "work for hire" contention by interpreting the
1976 Act "literally" to hold that an "employee" should be determined
through use of the common-law's agency doctrine.' 0 3 Under this ap-
proach, a court first determines whether a work was created by an em-
ployee or an independent contractor 1°4 within "the scope of employment"
by reference to the agency factors. 10 5 Once the creator's status is ascer-
tained, one of the two § 101 provisions will apply.10 6 Underlying this con-
struction was the court's belief that Congress had "radically"1 7 rewritten
the "work for hire" provision in the 1976 Act in order to confine the hiring
parties' ownership capabilities.10 8 Agency was therefore both broader than
97. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (citing
Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th
Cir. 1987)). See REsrATEmENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
98. 1 NIMMER & NimMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-16 (noting the "quick succession"
in which differing approaches arose after Aldon was decided).
99. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
100. Id. at 334-35 (cited in Reid, 490 U.S. at 739). See REsrrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220(2) (1958) (presenting a nonexclusive list of factors to distinguish a "servant" from an
"independent contractor").
101. Easter Sea, 815 F.2d at 324-25.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 329-30, 334-35. Easter Seal's "literal" interpretation read "§ 101 as reflection of
a simple dichotomy in fact between employees and independent contractors." Id. at 329.
104. See infra note 135 for the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958) agency
framework.
105. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1) (1958) employs a three-part test for
determining whether something occurred within "the scope of employment" in an attempt
to distinguish an independent contractor from an employee. Specifically, conduct is within
the scope of employment if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master ....
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 28(1) (1958).
106. Easter Sea, 815 F.2d at 329. In this context, the court stated that § 101(1) applied to
employees and § 101(2) to independent contractors. Id.
107. Id. at 330.
108. See id. at 330-31. A hiring party's ownership potential would be confined "[uinder
the literal interpretation of the 1976 Act, [because] independent contractors are always statu-
tory 'authors' unless they have written certain kinds of works and have signed away their
authorship rights." Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
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common notions of a traditional employee and narrower than employees
under 1909 Act analyses.' t° 9 Reading § 101 in this fashion, the court in
Easter Seal rejected the approach adopted by the A/don court.110
3. Section 101 Applies Only to Formal Employees
The fourth lower court version discussed by the Reid Court was that
§ 101(1) simply referred to "formal, salaried" employees.1 I The Court
cited Dumas v. Gommerman1 2 to support this position.
In this case, Jennifer Dumas, widow of the late graphic artist Patrick
Nagel and representative of his estate, brought a suit against Stefan Gom-
merman, a Los Angeles art gallery owner, for the alleged copyright in-
fringement of lithographs that Nagel had produced for ITT Cannon.
11 3
Nagel apparently created the lithographs under a 1979 ITT Cannon
purchase order that mentioned nothing about being "for hire" or a trans-
fer of its copyrights. 114 In 1985, Gommerman purchased the works from
ITT Cannon and any copyrights ITT may have owned in the works. Gom-
merman then registered them for copyright protection in 1986 under his
name.1 15 Gommerman was then notified by Dumas that she owned the
works' copyrights.1 1 6 Gommerman nevertheless made a poster-sized re-
production of one of the works and marketed it nationally. 117 Dumas
filed a conflicting copyright registration in 1987 and then sought a prelim-
inary injunction of Gommerman's continued commercialization of any of
the disputed works. 118 The district court granted Dumas' injunctive re-
quest and rejected Gommerman's argument that ITT Cannon had owned
Nagel's lithographs since they were "works for hire." 1 9 In affirming this
decision, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the 1976 Act's legislative history120 to
arrive at the conclusion that § 101(1) covered only "formal, salaried em-
.109. See id. The use of agency law in "work for hire" cases has been questioned for a
§ 101 "employee." See Hardy I, supra note 8, at 221 (arguing against such a technique).
Note, however, that the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989) held "that the term 'employee' should be understood in light of the
general common law of agency." Reid, 490 U.S. at 741. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228(1) (1958).
110. Easter Seai 815 F.2d at 334. Regarding Aldon's "actual control" standard as "more an
interpolation of the statute than an interpretation" of it, the Fifth Circuit outlined four
problems that Akfdn represented which made the Second Circuit's test unhelpful and a po-
tential retrograde into 1909 Act principles. Id. at 331, 334.
111. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (citing Du-
mas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989)). Professor Hardy, based on his interpre-
tation of legislative history and case law behind the 1976 Act, adhered strongly to the idea
that 'employee' within the work for hire context means only formal employees. Hardy I,
supra note 8, at 232-35.
112. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 1094.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1094-95.
117. Id. at 1095.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1098-1101.
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ployees" 121 while § 101(2) encompassed "[o] nly certain types of specially
commissioned works."122 Applying this analysis, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that Nagel had not prepared the "works for hire" and upheld in-
junctive relief for Dumas.
123
4. The Supreme Court's Approach in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid
124
James Earl Reid, a sculptor, donated his talents and time to create a
statue depicting three homeless minority individuals for display in a pag-
eant by the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV).125 Outside of
receiving design instructions from a CCNV member and occasional physi-
cal assistance from CCNV funded workers, Reid created the statue in his
studio and he did not use CCNV facilities. 12 6 When Reid finished the
statue, he delivered it for the pageant, but, after it was returned to him
following the pageant, he refused to give it back to CCNV because of his
belief that its physical composition could not endure the nationwide sculp-
ture tour planned by CCNV.1 2 7 A controversy then arose over whether
CCNV owned the statue by virtue of § 101 (1) or whether Reid created it as
an independent contractor.
128
After reviewing the four prevailing constructions of a "work for hire"
under the 1976 Act, 12 9 the Court held that an "employee" under the 1976
Act would be determined by consulting "the conventional master-servant
relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." 130 Endors-
ing Easter Seats rejection of Aldon's "actual control" test because "no statu-
tory support [existed] for an additional dichotomy between commissioned
works" involving disputed control,13 1 the Court made it clear that Con-
gress intended to provide two mutually exclusive ways for works to acquire
"for hire" status: one for employees and the other for independent con-
tractors. 132 The Court then asserted that it must first look to agency prin-
ciples to determine whether a creator is an employee or independent
contractor.133 This analysis required the Court to consider "the hiring
121. Id. at 1102.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1105.
124. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
125. Id. at 733-34. Reid agreed to donate his services, but the project's cost of approxi-
mately $15,000 was to be paid for by the Community for Creative Non-Violence. Id. at 734.
126. Id. at 734.
127. Id. at 735.
128. See id. at 735-36. Because the sculpture could not be a § 101(2) work because it
neither fell within the nine types of works nor had an express written agreement been exe-
cuted between the parties, the Court examined only the parameters of § 101(1) as it related
to the CCNV-Reid relationship. Id. at 738.
129. See supra notes 82-123 and accompanying text.
130. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. The Court rejected proposals favoring the "formal, salaried
employee" interpretation. Id. at 742 n.8.
131. Id. at 742.
132. Id. at 742-43. In confirming this reading of § 101's language, the Court further
emphasized that "only enumerated categories of commissioned works [under § 101 (2)] may
be accorded work for hire status." Id. at 748.
133. Id. at 751.
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party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished."13 4 Applying an analysis borrowed from the Restatement
(Second) of Agency,' 35 the Court held that although CCNV provided
Reid with some paid assistance, the extent to which CCNV controlled the
production's details was not "dispositive." 136 After making the analysis ac-
cording to the Restatement factors, the Court held that Reid was an in-
dependent contractor rather than a CCNV employee.
Thus, after Reid, courts have a framework to decipher whether a
§ 101(1) "employee" created the disputed work within the scope of her
employment. 137 If the status of the creator is disputed, the framework
examines the extent to which a hiring party exercised control over "the
manner and means" used in its creation before deciding whether it was
made "for hire."
With the Reid concerns laid out, the discussion now turns to "work for
hire" settings of two recent software ownership cases decided in light of
Reid.
134. Id. Professor Nimmer has cogently remarked that the principle enunciated by the
Supreme Court "is striking in its similarity to the rejected standard, i.e., right to control the
product." 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-21,
135. To determine whether an individual qualifies for § 101(1) "employee" status, the
Court listed a nonexclusive string of relevant analytical factors:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party, whether the hiring party is in business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 751-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)). RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) provides the following list of non-exclusive factors for help-
ing determine whether a person is a servant or an independent contractor:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or busi-
ness;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Importantly, the Court in Reid said that "no one of these factors is determinative," Reid,
490 U.S. at 752, thereby providing a seed bed for lower courts' discretionary preference over
which factors control.
136. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
137. As used in this context, "employee" means an individual that neither party disputes
as having been in the hiring party's employ when the contested program was written. Thus,
in approaching a "scope of employment" framework, post-Reid courts have applied a REsrATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY standard.
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II. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF RED IN THE COMPUTER PROGRAM CONTEXT
A. Aymes v. Bonelli'3
8
Jonathan Bonelli, President and C.E.O. of Island Recreational, hired
Clifford Scott Aymes, an engineer, to work as a computer programmer. 39
Aymes was engaged by Bonelli to modify programs used on one genera-
tion of IBM computers so they could be further employed on an upgraded
IBM system. 140 Between 1980 and 1982, Aymes developed a number of
record-keeping computer programs under Bonelli's general supervision
entitled "CSALIB." 14 1 Although Aymes claimed that these programs were
supposed to be used on a single computer in one Island office, they were
used instead at a number of Island business locations.
1 42
Without any notice, Bonelli cut Aymes' hours following CSALIB's cre-
ation, which ultimately led to Aymes' resignation from Island in Septem-
ber of 1982. At the time of his departure, however, Island owed Aymes
over $14,500 in wages. 143 After Aymes requested these back wages,
144
Bonelli stated that Aymes needed to execute a release of his CSALIB rights
before any back wages would be paid.145 Aymes refused. He registered
CSALIB under his name with the U.S. Copyright Office in 1985146 and
proceeded to file a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York against Bonelli and Island for, inter alia, copyright infringe-
ment of the CSALIB program.
t4 7
138. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
139. Id. at 859.
140. Aymes v. Bonelli, 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1716 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), afld an reconsideration,
23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
141. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859.
142. Aymes, 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1716. Aymes claimed that Bonelli had orally prom-
ised that CSALIB would "be used on one computer by one of Mr. Bonelli's corporations and
that [Aymes] was the only person who could modify those programs." Id.
143. Aymes., 980 F.2d at 859.
144. Id.
145. Id. Transfer of copyright ownership is covered by 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1988).
Although this issue was not before the court, Bonelli's request for Aymes' release is curious if
Bonelli believed Island was the CSALIB copyright owner. Aymes also requested compensa-
tion for the multi-site use of CSALIB because it contravened the intent of Bonelli's alleged
oral promise regarding CSALIB's limited use. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859.
146. Id. Copyright laws have been applicable to computer programs since the congressio-
nally created National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works recog-
nized the need for copyright protection of a program's expressive elements. See CONTU,
supra note 16, at 20-21. CONTU's findings resulted in two amendments to the 1976 Act: (1)
a definition of "computer program" under § 101; and (2) conditional permission for a pro-
gram owner to copy or modify the protected program under § 117. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980,
Pub. L. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)). It
was only after CONTU that computer programs became recognized by the courts as copy-
rightable "literary works." See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1236-38 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
147. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859. Under 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the owner of
a valid copyright can sustain an action for copyright infringement by showing that the de-
fendant copied "constituent elements of the work that are original." Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Along with the allegations of copy-
right infringement were claims involving New York state law. The copyright infringement
aspect of Aymes' suit, however, was severed from the pendent state claims and reassigned in
the district court. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859.
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After disagreeing with Aymes' allegations regarding Bonelli's oral
promise to restrict CSALIB's use to a single location,1 48 the district court
held that the CSALIB program was a work for hire that rendered Aymes'
copyright invalid. Therefore, the district court dismissed his infringement
claim. 149 Following this decision, Aymes filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion in the district court based upon the "work for hire" factors articulated
in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 1 °50 The district court con-
cluded, however, that Aymes was Island's "employee" based upon its appli-
cation of the Reid factors, and the court upheld its original ruling.151
Although the district court rejected Aymes' subsequent request for con-
tract rescission based upon Island's failure to pay back wages,' 5 2 it
awarded him $34,549.13 for the wages and interest.'5 Unsatisfied with
only a monetary award, Aymes appealed the district court's infringement
determination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded and held that
Aymes was an independent contractor and that the CSALIB program had
not been created "for hire."'
54
After determining that no written agreement existed assigning
CSALIB ownership from Aymes to Bonelli, the Second Circuit proceeded
to analyze the case in light of Reid's § 101(1) common-law agency stan-
dard.1 5 5 Taking a cue from the Supreme Court's suggestion that no one
factor in its twelve-part framework could be dispositive, 156 the Second Cir-
cuit reviewed the district court's application of the Reid test. The court of
appeals noted that the trial court's "factual findings as to the presence or
148. Aymes, 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1717 (finding "no basis to conclude ... that Mr.
Bonelli ever agreed to limit his right to use the programs he was paying for in a way that
would prohibit him from using it for any other corporation he might form or from ex-
panding his data processing capability by adding a second computer").
149. Id.
150. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). See Aymes v. Bonelli, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1317 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); see also supra note 135 (discussing the twelve Reid factors).
151. Aymes, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1317-18.
152. Aymes v. Bonelli, No. 85 Civ. 2228 (SM), 1991 WL 274811, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9,
1991). The effect of a contractual rescission in this context would have probably bestowed
upon Aymes the CSALIB program he created while at Island. Whether this weighed upon
the district court's ruling is unclear. It has been observed that a hiring party's material
breach of an employment contract should entitle the employee-creator to ownership of any
copyrighted works he or she created under the broken contract. See 1 NIMMER & NiMMER,
supra note 13, § 5.03[E], at 5-46 to 5-47.
153. Aymes v. Bonelli, No. 85 Civ. 2228 (JSM), 1991 WL 278913, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,
1991).
154. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
155. Id. at 860. Remember that for an assignment to be effective under § 101(2) there
must be a signed writing and the work must fall within one of the nine exclusive categories.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988). It should be noted, however, that the nine works listed in
subsection (2), which includes "instructional texts," does not preclude the future possibility
of a computer program being within its parameters. The reason for this is found in the
subsection's language, which provides that "an 'instructional text' is a literary... work pre-
pared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities."
Computer programs are currently classified under copyright law as "literary works" of author-
ship. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (defining both "computer program" and
"literary works").
156. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
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absence of the Reid factors [could not] be reversed unless clearly errone-
ous."157 Notably, the court asserted, that de novo review applied to the
ultimate legal determination of whether the CSALIB program was a work
for hire.
15 8
The Second Circuit determined that, while some factors might often
have little probative value, "some factors will be significant in virtually
every situation." 159 These consistently significant factors included: "(1)
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of creation;
16°
(2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax
treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party."161 Using this as its
foundation, the court found that the district court's "mechanistic" applica-
tion of the Reid factors misconstrued their relative value for determining
whether Aymes was an Island employee. 162 The court of appeals instead
balanced the factors according to their practical relevance.
163
1. Applying the Weighted Factors
Noting that the district court did not specifically examine the "right
to control" factor,1M the court reasoned that the directions and program-
ming limitations placed upon Aymes during his programming of CSALIB
caused this factor to weigh in favor of Island's claim that Aymes was its
employee.
165
Examining the next factor, Aymes' "[1] evel of skill," the Second Circuit
rejected the district court's finding that Aymes' CSALIB programming re-
quired " no peculiar expertise or creative genius. "166 Finding conversely
157. Id. at 860-61.
158. Id. at 861.
159. Id. To illustrate this point, the court remarked that "the factors relating to the au-
thority to hire assistants" would be irrelevant if the hired party worked alone. Aymes, 980 F.2d
at 861. The Second Circuit's weighted application of Reid has been questioned. See Respect
Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 n.11 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(questioning, but not deciding, whether Aymes' weighted "gloss should be superimposed on
what the ultimate authority - the Supreme Court - has said in [Reid]").
160. This standard was enunciated by the Reid Court outside of the multifactor enumera-
tion that followed, which seemed to make it the primary "inquiry" around which the dozen
listed factors revolved. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751
(1989). The Second Circuit's election to treat this as if it constituted a part of the dozen Reid
factors relevant to a determination of the "hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product" seemed to be redundant.
161. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. Other courts take a similar view. See, e.g., Merchant v.
Lymon, 828 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding "the hiring parties' right to control
the manner and means of creation, the method of payment, the skill required, the provision
of employee benefits, the tax treatment of the hired party, and whether the hiring party has
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party" to be "[t]he most important
factors").
162. Id. at 861-62. The court found that by giving "each factor equal weight and simply
count[ing] the number of factors for each side.... the district court "over-emphasized inde-
terminate and thus irrelevant factors having little or no bearing on Aymes' case." Id. at 861.
163. Id. at 862.
164. Id. at 862.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Aymes v. Bonelli, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1317, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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that Aymes was "a skilled craftsman," the court concluded that this factor
weighed "heavily" in favor of Aymes' independent contractor status.
16 7
Next, the court examined two factors together: employee benefits
and tax treatment. 168 Island did not provide Aymes with employee bene-
fits nor did it pay any of his social security taxes or withhold state or fed-
eral income taxes. 169 After reviewing these factors, the district court
concluded that Aymes was working "off the books;"' 7 0 however, the Sec-
ond Circuit gave these factors "even greater weight" because Island had
not contested them.' 7 1 The Second Circuit focused on the fact that Island
denied Aymes the advantages conferred upon its employees while receiv-
ing the business benefits of treating him as an independent contractor.
172
The court concluded that an inequity would result if Island could manipu-
late the classification by denying Aymes his employee privileges at one
time, while at another time permissibly classifying him as an employee in
order to avoid any potential liability.173 In concluding its discussion on
the tax and benefit factors, the Second Circuit suggested that these two
factors would usually distinguish an employee from an independent
contractor.
174
Addressing the final weighted factor of whether Bonelli had a right to
assign other projects to Aymes, the court found that this factor weighed in
Island's favor because Bonelli assigned other projects, in addition to
CSALIB, to Aymes. 175 The court, however, accorded little weight to this
factor because "the delegation of additional projects.., is not inconsistent
with [the duties of an] independent trouble shooter."
17 6
Finally, after examining the Reid test's "remaining factors," the court




170. Id. (quoting Aymes, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1318).
171. See id. In fact, the court opined that since these two factors had not been challenged
by Island throughout the case's ten year duration, their absence unequivocally supported the
conclusion that Island was not treating Aymes as an employee. Id. at 862-63.
172. The benefits to Island would include an absence of expenses for Aymes' benefit
package and payment of his payroll taxes. Id. at 862.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 863. See also Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1313 (suggesting the that an "em-
ployee" could be classified on the basis of whether she has received employment benefits
along with taxes being withheld from her salary).
175. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
176. Id.
177. Id. Dealing with these factors "in order of their relative importance" to this case the
court concluded as follows:
(1) "the method of payment" presented a conflict in that Aymes had been paid
both hourly and flat fees. The court agreed with the district court's finding that this
factor was inconclusive;
(2) as Island's business involved the sale of swimming pools, Aymes' programming
of CSALIB was therefore not the "work [of] Island's regular business." The court
noted, however, that businesses often hire people performing duties outside of
their regular course. As a result, the court deemed this factor to "be of little use in
evaluating a claim that a work was made for hire;"
(3) the next factor, "[w ] hether Island is in business" was discredited by the court as
"always hav[ing] very little weight in this analysis;"
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that Aymes was an independent contractor owning the CSALIB
copyright.
1 78
Of apparently great significance to this decision was the absence of a
formalized written agreement between Aymes and Bonelli as to CSALIB's
copyright ownership. Due to Aymes' independent contractor status,
§ 101(2) would have been applicable if a written agreement existed;
whether or not CSALIB would have been considered a statutorily listed
work, however, remains a matter of speculation. 179 In the end, however,
the court needed only to evaluate Aymes' situation with regard to the Reid
factors before concluding that they weighed in his favor, a clear reflection
of the creator-favoring presumption embodied in the 1976 Copyright
Act.18 0 In those cases where the creator's employment status is undis-
(4) an impasse existed as to "[t]he discretion over when and how long to work"
because Aymes could work when he wanted although Island was controlling the
project;
(5) the court gave "[t]he duration of the relationship," inquiry little weight be-
cause of Aymes' inconsistent involvement with Island;
(6) although "[tihe location of the work" was not expressly covered by the district
court, the Second Circuit found it to be of little weight because Aymes was required
to work in Island's offices to have access to the proper computer hardware;
(7) as "[t ] he location of the work" had been given minor attention, so too was "the
source of the equipment;" and
(8) Finally, the court found Aymes' "authority to hire assistants" almost meaning-
less where he did not require any.
Id. at 863-64. For another court that has taken a similar approach, see Merchant v. Lymon,
828 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (suggesting by implication that some factors are of
minimal significance in comparison to others).
178. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 864.
179. Statutory guidance for this notion can be found in the language of § 101 (2), which
makes specially ordered or commissioned "instructional texts" works for hire. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988). Under the statute, an "instructional text" can be a literary work "prepared for
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities." Id. Defined in
this way, it might be argued that an "instructional text" could encompass a specially ordered
or commissioned computer program similar to the one at issue in Aymes. Cf. Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (adjudging a case under § 101 (2) and
finding no ownership in a hiring party).
180. See also MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d
769 (3d Cir. 1991). In this case, the Third Circuit addressed the "work for hire" issue in
another software infringement case. Here, the court first relied upon Reid's twelve factor
"employee" standard to hold that MacLean was not a Mercer "employee" when the contested
JEMSystem program was written, but rather an independent contractor. Id. at 778. Although
predating Aymes, the Third Circuit employed a similar type of weighted Reid standard to find
MacLean's skill and discretion used in writing JEMSystem to weigh in his favor. Id. at 777.
Resembling a "right to control the manner and means" factor, the court also found that
MacLean's writing of JEMSystem on his personal system also to weigh in his favor. Id. The
court also found that when MacLean created JEMSystem, Mercer was not in the business of
providing software to its clients and that MacLean's discretion over when and where to work
onJEMSystem weighed against his being characterized as a Mercer "employee." Id. Further-
more, because MacLean's payments from Mercer were for consultations rather than being a
salary and that Mercer was not witholding any taxes or providing benefits to him once he left
in 1985, he was not a § 101(1) "employee." Id.
Within their rationale, however, was the Third Circuit's analysis of an "apparent agency"
factor as it related to a client of Mercer that MacLean still serviced. This aspect of the deci-
sion focused on the client's perception of how MacLean was or was not associated with
Mercer.
Although MacLean portrayed himself to the client as still being a Mercer employee, the
court noted that Reid's "central focus" was "the relationship between the person performing
the work and the person paying him to perform the work." Id. at 777-78. Therefore, despite
the client's lack of knowledge that MacLean left Mercer's employ in 1985, the court focused
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puted insofar as it relates to the time period when the program was cre-
ated, or when the creator was an "employee" during the program's
writing, the Reid factors fall into the background as the court must deter-
mine instead whether the program was created within the employee's
"scope of employment." Addressing this precise issue was a recent U.S.
district court decision.
B. Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer98 '
From May 1984 to April 1992, Jeffrey Peiffer was employed as a com-
puter programmer by Avtec Systems, a government contractor which pro-
vided space-related computer services.1 82 In 1985, Peiffer began writing
the "Orbit Program" ("Orbit") for Avtec.' 8 3 Following a demonstration of
Orbit to Avtec's President, Ronald Hirsch, Mr. Hirsch and another Avtec
employee, Mr. Greg Kope, asked Peiffer to modify Orbit before it would
be marketed.' 8 4 Peiffer, in making the suggested program changes and
charging Avtec accordingly, developed Orbit into the ".309 version."
185
In 1988, Orbit was used as a demonstrative representation of Avtec's
technological capabilities in the space satellite field. The 1988 demonstra-
tion helped Avtec secure a government contract.1 8 6 In February, 1990,
Peiffer gave Orbit to an Avtec employee for use in another demonstration.
However, this employee discovered a number of bugs in the program that
Peiffer corrected before the demonstration.18 7 Two years later Peiffer
demonstrated an updated version of Orbit to NASA that did not include
on "the nature of the relationship between Mr. MacLean and Mercer," not the third-party
client's perception of MacLean's affiliation with Mercer. Id. at 778. At this point in the
decision, the court referred to the Restatement (Second) of Agency. The court concluded
that the client's perception of MacLean as Mercer's 'apparent" agent was not dispositive.
Rather, whether MacLean was an "actual" agent was the crucial question. Id. See also NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B] [I] [a] [iii], at 5-21 n.71.1 (discussing MacLean's "actual"
agency holding).
181. 805 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992), affid in par, rev'd in part and remanded, Nos. 92-
2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1994).
182. Id. at 1314.
183. Id. at 1315. The court described the "Orbit Program" as follows:
The Orbit Program is a computer program which displays orbital simulations and
related data in graphic form on a Macintosh computer. Specifically, the Orbit Pro-
gram displays the path of orbits relative to certain earth positions, the visibility of
satellites from certain earth stations, the visibility of stars from the satellite, and
calculates and displays various data in a graphic format. The Orbit Program's uni-
queness stems from the fact that the Macintosh permits the Orbit Program's user to
interact directly with it by using a handheld control known as a "mouse" and the
program displays data in graphic form.
Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1315-16.
186. Id. at 1315. The Fourth Circuit has since rejected this utilitarian finding by the dis-
trict court in regard to Avtec's .309 program, concluding that it "inject[ed] into the analysis of
copyright ownership an element contemplated neither by the Restatement's scope of em-
ployment test nor by the law of copyright generally...." 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *11. This
conclusion does not, however, bind the district court to alter its ultimate legal conclusion on
remand-a conclusion based upon the creator-favoring presumption. See infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
187. Id. at 1315-16.
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improvements he knew were important to NASA.18 8 As a result, Avtec did
not receive the NASA contract.18 9 One month later, in February 1992,
Peiffer refused to demonstrate Orbit for a potential Avtec client, claiming
"he did not have a copy of [Orbit] at the office." 190
A potential reason for Peiffer's conduct involved his prior independ-
ent acts outside of Avtec. Unbeknownst to Avtec, Peiffer had begun in-
dependent work on the Orbit program in 1989 in order to alter it from
the demonstration program used by Avtec into a "stand alone" program
for commercial distribution.19 1 The impetus behind this Orbit modifica-
tion arose out of a 1989 meeting Peiffer had with Mr. Paul F. Kisak, the
sole shareholder and president of Kisak-Kisak, Inc. ("KKI").192 The two
men discussed marketing a modified Orbit program through KKI.193 In
March of 1989, Peiffer entered into an agreement with KKI that gave KKI
exclusive license to market the updated Orbit program.' 94 From its 1989
inception until the time the case was heard in 1992, this modified version
of Orbit generated $197,000 in gross revenues for KKI, with $98,500 going
to Peiffer.
19 5
After learning of Orbit's commercial distribution through KKI, Avtec
instituted an action against Peiffer, Kisak and KKI, alleging, inter alia, that
the Orbit program was prepared by Peiffer within the scope of his employ-
ment. According to the action, Orbit was a work for hire thereby making
Avtec the true owner.
196
Initially, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that Peiffer was a full-time Avtec employee when he created
Orbit.197 The court went on to hold that Peiffer owned the Orbit pro-
gram's copyright despite his employee status because Avtec "failed to over-
come the presumption that [a work's creator] is its rightful owner for
copyright purposes."' 9 8
Avtec argued that Peiffer created the Orbit Program within the "scope
of his employment." On the other hand Peiffer argued that he created
the Orbit Program as a "hobby. "199 After addressing these arguments,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia undertook a Reid
"work for hire" analysis.
188. Id. at 1316.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Under the same reasoning expressed in note 186 supra, the Fourth Circuit found
the "stand alone" characterization to be outside of copyright's "work for hire" policy objec-
tives. 1994 U.S. LEXIS, at *11.
192. Id. at 1314-16.
193. Id. at 1316.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1317. Avtec also sued Peiffer and KKI for misappropriation of its Orbit trade
secrets, misappropriation of business opportunity and Peiffer individually for breach of fidu-
ciary duty. Id. at 1314.
197. Id. at 1318.
198. Id. at 1319.
199. Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (E.D. Va. 1992), affid in par, rev'd
in part and remanded, Nos. 92-2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1994).
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The court stated as a preliminary matter that Reids construction of
the 1976 Act, creates a "presumption ... that the one who creates the work
is its rightful owner for copyright purposes. This presumption may be
overcome, however, if the work is one 'made for hire.'"200 Next, the
court laid out Reid's two step approach: (1) was the " 'creator'" of the
disputed work an " 'employee' " or an " 'independent contractor' "; and if
found to be an employee, (2) was the work generated within the creator's
scope of employment.20 1 The district court first found that Peiffer was
Avtec's full-time employee during the disputed time period of Orbit's crea-
tion.2 0 2 Then the court turned to the second leg of the test.
Citing a "three-part Restatement test" enunciated by the Reid
Court, 20 3 the court found as a matter of law that Avtec did not satisfy its
evidentiary burden for the "scope of employment" requirement.2 0 4 The
court concluded that Avtec failed to prove that the KKI version, Orbit
2.05, was created within the scope of Peiffer's employment. 20 5 In particu-
lar, the court noted that Avtec provided insufficient evidence to show that
the 2.05 version was created "within Avtec authorized time and space lim-
its." 20 6 Furthermore, Peiffer created the 2.05 version outside of his Avtec
hours, on his own personal equipment and not as a service to Avtec.
20 7
Because Avtec failed to satisfy the tripartite Restatement test, the court
held that Avtec also "failed to overcome the presumption that Peiffer, as




201. Id. at 1317-18 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751).
202. Id. at 1318. This does not stray from Red, which states only that § 101(1) cannot be
restricted to formal, salaried employees, not that such an employee classification is outside of
§ 101(1)'s purview. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8 (rejecting "the suggestion . . . that the
§ 101 (1) term 'employee' refers only to formal, salaried employees") (emphasis added).
203. Avtec, 805 F. Supp. at 1318; see supra note 105.
204. Id. at 1318.
205. Id. at 1318-19.
206. Id. at 1318.
207. Id. at 1319. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on the issue of whether
Peiffer's 2.05 program was created within the scope of his employment at Avtec. This rever-
sal, however, turned upon the narrow issue of whether or not Peiffer's creation of the 2.05
program "was at least 'appreciably' motivated by a desire to further its corporate goals in
order to satisfy the third element of the [Restatement § 228] work-for-hire test." 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS, at *11. Despite its reversal, the Fourth Circuit expressed an awareness that
Avtec may, on remand, still be unable to satisfy the work-for-hire test. Id. at *17. Hence, the
Fourth Circuit's remand can be easily read as an endorsement of the creator favoring
presumption.
208. Id. Curiously, the court did not distinguish which version of Orbit applied to its
decision, leaving this important detail subject to conjecture. See Improved Software was not
Work for Hire but Violated Trade Secrets, Pat., Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) No. 1106, at 43
(Nov. 19, 1992) (remarking that the court's ambiguous referral to the "Orbit program" will
leave many questions about its decision open to question).
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The court also rejected Avtec's claim for joint authorship,2 0 9 stating
that Avtec failed to demonstrate an "intent to merge separate efforts into a
unitary whole."
21 0
Thus, notwithstanding its noting that a rebuttable "work for hire"
ownership presumption resides in the creator of a work under the 1976
Copyright Act, the Avtec court made it abundantly clear that a hiring party
will not receive the same presumptive favortism that it enjoyed under the
1909 Copyright Act. To have held otherwise would have contradicted the
policy concerns symbolized by the Supreme Court in Reid.
2 11
III. ANALYSIS
The Aymes2 12 and Avtec213 interpretations of Reid recognize a clear
policy underpinning: the presumption under the 1976 Act has swung
away from the employer or commissioning party to the employee or crea-
tive individual producing a copyrightable work. In the past, many cases
seemed to focus on which of the two parties was best able to disseminate
the work publicly. This focal party was typically the one with "deep pock-
ets."2 14 For example, the Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.21 5 "actual
control" test 216 arguably embraced the view that the party better equipped
to market and distribute a work to the public would prevail in a "work for
hire" dispute.2 17 Since the Supreme Court's rejection of this standard,
218
a judicial trend has developed that favors the creator of a work over the
person best prepared to disseminate it.2 19 This trend is evidenced by the
209. A "joint work" is defined under copyright as "a work prepared by two or more au-
thors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Authors of a joint
work will be co-owners of the copyright in the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
210. Avtec, 805 F. Supp. at 1319.
211. But see Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D. S.C. 1992) (reaching an
opposite result in a case similar to Avtec).
212. Aymes represents a weighted application of the Reid factors for differentiating an
"employee" from an "independent contractor" based on the particular facts of a case.
213. Avtec stands for an application of a three-part Restatement test for determining
whether a work has been created within one's "scope of employment."
214. See, I.T. Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law's Work-Made-For-Hire Doc-
trine, 12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & AsRrs 181 (1988) [hereinafter Hardy II] (arguing that the "better
exploiter," or party best-suited to distribute a work to the public, was generally the victor in a
1909 Act "work for hire" controversy).
215. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
216. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
217. See Hardy II, supra note 214, at 220 (asserting that Aldon, a U.S. business, was "in a
better position to exploit the figurines commercially" than the foreignJapanese firm involved
with their creation).
218. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742 (1989) (con-
cluding that the "actual control" test cannot be supported by "the language and structure of
§ 101"). A major problem with the Aldon approach was that it seemed to "carry[ I forward"
1909 Act principles into a 1976 Act context. 1 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B],at
5-15 to 5-16; see also Litman, supra note 61, at 899-90. Other courts have not been immune
from the temptation to read the 1976 Act in terms of the 1909 Act's caselaw. See, e.g., Rock-
ford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985) (relying upon
1909 Act case law in adjudging a matter clearly within the scope of § 102(b) in the 1976
Copyright Act), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
219. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323, 331 (5th. Cir. 1987) (finding its "literal" interpretation of the 1976 Act to make
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rationale of decisions such as Aymes and Avtec. Reflecting this trend are
the two decisions' pro-creator common-law approaches:
(1) that which enables a court to weigh, within its discretion,
the Reid factors as it deems appropriate; 220 , or
(2) using the Restatement's § 228(1) tripartite "scope of em-
ployment" test.
2 2 1
The inescapable conclusion is that along with Congress' revision of
the "work for hire" provisions in the 1976 Act came a refocus on the bed-
rock principle of United States' copyright laws: " [t]o Promote... for lim-
ited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings."22 2 The Supreme Court's outline of a general common-law for-
mat in Reid provided the lower courts with a workable means to foster this
constitutional principle. Therefore, absent an express written agreement
between the creating parties or the creation of a § 101 (2) listed work, a
rebuttable presumption now rests in the creative author. 223 This ap-
proach benefits the public by favoring those who expand our wealth of
artistic treasures-creative individuals who put their natural gifts into the
design of valuable works such as socially beneficial computer programs.
CONCLUSION
Since the mid-nineteenth century courts have wrestled with issues of
copyright ownership in works created out of an employment setting. At
first, courts adopted a master-servant presumption which rested ownership
in the employer. Although shaping this presumption around the em-
ployer-employee relationship, courts construing the ambiguous 1909
Copyright Act merged this previously applied presumption into cases in-
volving commission relationships. The conflict arising out of this judicial
approach, which failed to differentiate employees from commissioned par-
ties, was a major catalyst for the copyright laws' "work for hire" revision.
In 1976, Congress enacted a statutory framework (the Copyright Act
of 1976) that placed the parties associated with a work's creation on more
equal footing. Since its enaction, courts have constructed and applied the
independent contractors statutory authors unless a particular statutory work has been cre-
ated subject to an express written agreement between the parties), cet. denied, 485 U.S. 981
(1988).
220. See, e.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1992); Marco v. Accent Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding photographer to have been
an independent contractor where only three Reid factors weighed in the commissioning
party's favor); Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar, CA89-4684, 1990 WL 69013 at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. May
23, 1990) (holding computer programmer's application software to not be a § 101 (1) "work
for hire" using selected Reid factors). See also Robert A. Kreiss, supra note 60, at 172-73 (dis-
cussing Reid's agency test as susceptible to judicial manipulation).
221. Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd in part,
vacated in part and remanded, Nos. 92-2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6,
1994).
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
223. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (1 1th Cir. 1990)
(holding a work to have not been created "for hire" through an application of selected Reid
factors and a finding that the architectural drawings were neither created under contract nor
a § 101 (2) listed work).
1994]
718 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVLEW [Vol. 71:3
framework in a manner that gives creative individuals significant bargain-
ing leverage against funding parties. With a continued judicial observance
of this trend, imaginative individuals not under contract will have a bar-
gaining chip to offset the funding party's "deep pockets"-it is called the
law.
